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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant/Respondent would suggest the reformation of the Appellant Deputy 
Attorney General's claim (pg 1 opnbrf Appellant) that this appeal is somehow linked to a "split 
Of acuthority" as to the need for specific advisement as to the right to presence of counsel 
During custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Rather, the nature of this appeal is whether the "Miranda rights" 
Communicated to Appellee prior to his custodial interrogation by eighteen year veteran 
Franklin County sheriff detective Jensen were "constitutionally inadequate and deficient" 
(pg 116 Clksrec-memo decision suppression motion) and "confusing" (pg 113 Clks rec) so as 
To require their suppression as evidence pursuant to Miranda, supra 
It is simply a mischaracterization to claim this appeal is limited to issues surrounding 
Failure to advise Appellee of his right to the presence of counsel during custodial interrogation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 15, 2015, McNeely was in custody in the Franklin County Sheriff's Office 
incident to his arrest for a misdemeanor probation violation. (Tr., p.17, L.23 p.18, L.10.) 
Detective Jensen had previously received a report that McNeely had sexual contact with a 
minor, T.E., and had sought to contact McNeely in order to interview him. (Tr., p.8, L.24 
p.9, L.11; State's Ex. 1 at I: 15 1:45; 2:55 4:05.) Recognizing McNeely when he came into 
the office, Detective Jensen requested the interview. (Id.) 
1 
As the interview began, Detective Jensen advised McNeely of a portion of his rights under 
Miranda.supra (Tr., p.11, L.23 p.12, L.13; see also State's Ex. 1 at 1 :40 15.) McNeely 
then waived the Miranda rights of which he was informed and made a statement.. (See State's 
Ex. 1 at 4:15 5:30, 9:25 10:50.) 
The state charged McNeely with lewd and lascivious conduct. (R., pp.53-54.) McNeely 
filed a motion to suppress his statement, asserting that his statements were coerced and that he 
was not sufficiently advised of his right to counsel. (R., pp.70-71, 83-90, 97-99.) The district 
court held a hearing on the suppression motion. (R., pp.94- 95; see also tr.) Following the 
hearing, the district court in adopting widespread interpretation of Miranda's requirements and 
more specifically the rationale of United States v.Noti, 731 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1984) 
granted McNeely's suppression motion. (R., pp.107-17.) The state filed a notice of appeal 
timely from the order granting suppression. (R., pp.125-27. 
2 
Did District Judge Mitchell W. Brown make clearly erroneous findings of fact or 
Misapply the constitutional requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) when 
He issued his January 16, 2016 Order Suppressing Appellee' s statement to Franklin County 
Detective sheriff Jensen in Franklin County criminal action CR-2015-587. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
DISTRICT JUDGE BROWN SUPPRESSED RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT 
THROUGH ADOPTION AND PROPER APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES TO FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before Detective Jensen began questioning McNeely in relation to his sexual 
contact with a minor, T.E., the detective advised McNeely of a portion of his rights 
under Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Tr. , p. 11 , L. 2 3 - p. 12, L. 13; see 
also State's Ex. 1 at 1 :35 - 2:15.) The district court set forth the following relevant 
dialogue: 
Detective Jensen: You kind of got yourself in a spot. 
McNeely: Uh huh. 
Detective Jensen: And I need to visit with you about it. But I 
need-I need to have you understand-I need to talk to you about-first 
about your rights. 
McNeely: Kay. 
Detective Jensen: Do you understand your rights? 
McNeely: Uh, read them all to me again. 
Detective Jensen: Okay. You have the right to remain silent. You 
understand that? 
McNeely: Yes. 
Detective Jensen: You have the right-uhm-because 
4 
anything you say can and will be used against you in court. 
McNeely: (Nodding his head up and down). 
Detective Jensen: You have the right to have an attorney, do you 
understand that? 
McNeely: (Simultaneously nodding his head up and down). 
Detective Jensen: To help you with-stuff. 
Detective Jensen: And if you can't afford an attorney we'll provide 
one for you. 
Detective Jensen. Do you understand all that? 
Mr. McNeely: (Nodding his head up and down) Uh-huh. 
(R., p.112, (citing State's Ex. 1).) 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 
789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, 
we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we 
freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho at 561,916 P.2d at 1286. Quoting State V Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 
(Idaho App. 2006) 
C, The trial court did not at any time rule that it felt "bound" to follow or controlled in any 
5 
wav by Ninth Circuit precedent. 
114 Clks rec, it is clear from the record that it simply adopts the ruling in Noti, supra at 615 
There are substantial practical reasons for requiring that defendants be advised of 
their right to counsel during as well as before questioning. "The circumstances surrounding in-
custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will.. .. Even preliminary advice 
given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation 
process." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 369-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1625-26, citing Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762 n. 5, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Concerned that 
a defendant who chooses not to consult with counsel before questioning will be unaware of his 
right to counsel once questioning begins, the Supreme Court has held that "the need for counsel 
to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel 
prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so 
desires." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1625-26. The right to have counsel 
present during questioning is meaningful. Advisement of this right is not left to the option of the 
police; it is mandated by the Constitution. Noti, supra at 615 
While the trial court does indicate that it feels "compelled" to follow Noti, supra in ftnt. 9 
Of its Memorandum Decision Suppressing Appellee's Statement at pg.116 elks' rec there is no 
indication there or otherwise that the trial court adopts Noti's,supra rationale for reasons other 
than the trial courts' agreement with the application of Notis' ,supra constitutional principles. 
It is also important to hold in mind that the advising officer in Noti,supra provided his 
suspect with express knowledge of his right to counsel befhre questioning No such advice 
was provided Tyrell McNeely by FCSO Sgt. Jensen. 
the 
core of the Advisement required by Miranda,supra 
Sgt. Jensen failed to communicate 
Miranda's third warning ; the only one at issue here; addresses our particular 
concern that "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very 
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] 
by his interrogators." Id., at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Responsive to that 
concern, we stated, as "an absolute prerequisite to interrogation," that an individual held 
for questioning "must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer 
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation." Id., at 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
6 
L.Ed.2d 694. The question before us is whether the warnings Powell received satisfied 
this requirement. Florida v Powell, 559 US 50 at 60 (2010) 
The investigating officer in PowclLsupra warned his suspect of his right to consult with 
counsel before any questioning as did the officers in California v Prysock, 453 US 355(1981) 
and Duckworth v Eagan. 492 US 195 (1989). The trial court in this case was persuaded 
by Noti's,supra rationale and its applicability to the totality of the circumstances here to employ 
Nati.supra to suppmi the trial courts determination that the "Miranda" rights Det. Jensen claimed 
to have provided Tyrell McNeely were inadequate, deficient and confusing. (Memo Decision 
Clk's rec 113,115) 
C. WITHIN THE TOT ALI TY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND AS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE MIRANDA ADVISEMENT GIVEN BY DET. 
JENSEN TO HIS SUSPECT (APPELLEE) WERE INADEQUATE, DEFICIENT AND 
CONFUSING BY PROPER APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. 
7 
This rationale has been ratified by Idaho's appellate courts most recently in 
Hughes v Idaho, 148 Idaho 448 at 457 (Ct. App.2009) 
(Idaho App. 2001) 
We conclude that Tapp's challenge to this interrogation technique is well taken. 
Miranda itself states that "the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege 
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have 
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 
86 S.Ct. at 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721. (Emphasis added) 
The key and undisputed fact in this case is that Det. Jensen advised Appellee/defendant 
8 
Of neither his right to the presence counsel before any interrogation nor during interrogation. 
(emphasis added) Thus, Det. Jensen failed to carry out the primary advise necessary to 
Apprise his suspect that he had a right to the presence of counsel before and during 
Interrogation. The Opening Brief submitted by the State blurs this distiction. Of all the case 
Law submitted as supporting the State's position, only US V Caldwell, 954 F2nd 496 (8th Cir. 
1992) and US V Frankson, 83 F3d 79 ( 4th Cir.1996) contain factual scenarios where advisement 
The right to presence of counsel before and during interrogation were omitted by 
interrogators. With fifty years of legal precedent available to him, the Deputy Attorney 
General has only two cases which arguably support his position. Every other case cited by the 
State contains an express advisement of the right to presence of counsel before interrogation 
With the issue limited to whether express advisement of the right to presence counsel during 
interrogation is an essential additional advisement. Caldwell, supra holds only that 
omission of express presence of counsel during interrogation is not plain error (a failure to 
object situation far from that confronting this court). Frankson,sugra is a 4th Circuit case 
long on" ipse dixit" and short on rationale. It's only cited authority is Caldwell, sugra. 
The claim by Det. Jensen that counsel would only help "with stuff' adds to the 
Misleading nature of his advisements to Appellee. This situation involves a sheriffs deputy 
With eighteen years experience as an investigator. He knows he is about to conduct an 
Interrogation which requires a waiver of his suspects Fifth Amendment right to silence 
And the presence of an attorney. The function of counsel is very simply stated in this 
Situation. McNeely has a right to the presence of counsel before and during interrogation 
To advise him whether to submit to and/or continue to submit to interrogation. Det. Jensen's 
Failure to advise his suspect of the simple particulars of defense counsel's function in a Fifth 
Amendment situation is a limited description of what Det. Jensen knows that function to be. 
9 
This ·'help you with stuff'distortion obscures further the suspect's immediate right to the 
presence of counsel before and during interrogation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
Court's Order granting suppression of Defendant/Respondent's statement and that it remand 





I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of OCTOBER, 2016, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
11 
